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Comment on “The Empirical Basis for Antitrust:
Cartels, Mergers, and Remedies”
JOHN M. CONNOR and ROBERT H. LANDE
ABSTRACT In this journal, James Langenfeld critically reviewed four of the present
authors’ articles that analyze the size of cartel overcharges and their antitrust policy
implications. In this comment, we explain why we believe Langenfeld errs in his
criticism of our work. In particular, this comment discusses the variation in research
quality of the sources used to compile a large sample of historical cartel overcharges;
the advisability of trimming outliers or large estimates from the sample; alleged
publication bias; why our 25% median estimate is much more likely to be correct than
the US Sentencing Guideline’s 10% presumption; and the implications of the average
cartel overcharges results for optimal deterrence and antitrust policy.
Key Words: Cartel; Collusion; Overcharges; Price Effects; Antitrust; Competition
Law; Price Fixing.
JEL Classifications: K14; K21; L11; L13; L4.
Dr. James Langenfeld, who has a distinguished record in government,
academia, and economic consulting, published an article in this journal
critically assessing research on empirical estimates of cartel overcharges.1
Specifically, Langenfeld reviews four publications by the present authors. The
first is a lengthy law-review article that lays out in some detail the sources,
methods, and descriptive patterns of overcharges of cartels by type, place, and
time period (Connor 2014a).2 He also comments on three antitrust policy
results of the overcharges findings in Connor and Lande (2008, 2012, 2015).
Langenfeld gives two reasons for choosing these four articles: (1) they illustrate
“the state of the art” in empirical cartel studies, and (2) they tend to be cited in
support of “more aggressive antitrust enforcement” and “stronger monetary
penalties for antitrust conspiracies” (Langenfeld 2017, 1–2, 15). After offering
these remarks, Langenfeld then tends to focus on a number of putative
shortcomings in these papers.
The authors are indebted to the many helpful comments provided by the anonymous referees and
to Jacey Smith for valuable research assistance.
John M. Connor, Department of Agricultural Economics, Purdue University, 403 West State Street, West
Lafayette, IN 47907-4773, USA; e-mail: jconnor@purdue.edu. Robert H. Lande, School of Law, University of
Baltimore, 1420 N. Charles Street, Baltimore, MD 21201, USA; e-mail: rlande@ubalt.edu.
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We agree with Langenfeld that some of these issues may be conceptually
troubling. However, in this comment, we show that the alleged imperfections
in the overcharges estimates are not empirically significant for the purpose of
drawing policy implications. In the comment, we address Langenfeld’s
erroneous reasoning and his lack of empirical support for his assertions that
his critiques undermine the importance of this research.
Criticisms of the Overcharges Data
One repeated point made by Langenfeld is that the “quality” of the cartel
overcharge estimates collected vary significantly.3 This follows from a
conscious research decision we made at the outset for the following reasons.
First, the statistical training to which all economists adhere demands that no
sample point ought to be lightly discarded. An outlier in a data set can be
rejected for a statistical analysis only after initial modeling is performed and
the data point has characteristic that proves that it comes from a different
universe. Had we picked and chosen only the “best” cartel studies, we would
have been open to the criticism that the cartel studies we included were not
typical or representative. So we chose the opposite approach: an all-inclusive
catholic approach, which of course comes with its own set of problems.
Second, it became apparent that book-length studies of the archives of cartel
secretariats by historians or the occasional journalist, although methodologically
dated, were worthy of respect.4 How can a researcher judge what was worthy or
unworthy from a scholar from a different era or from a different tradition? And
which is worse: omitting the principal work of some contemporary economist
focusing on the mastery of a dubious cutting-edge method, or including an
analysis of some great but superannuated 19th century scholar?
Third, there are ways to adjust for variable quality of data points in
analytically approved ways. As discussed below, meta-analysis is one such
method. Similarly, we included as a rough double-check on the results of our
sample of economics studies a data sample that Langenfeld completely
ignored: final verdicts in US cartel cases that were not overturned on appeal.5
For whatever reason, Langenfeld discounts this sample. Many policy makers
are lawyers, however, and they might well think more highly of court verdicts.
Cartel scholars have adopted many different criteria to compile their
literature reviews. For example, Connor and Lande (2005, table 1) present
mean and median cartel overcharges contained in several prominent
researchers’ literature reviews, the following three of which Langenfeld
discusses. One fairly could ask, for example, how, out of the hundreds of
cartel studies available, did Judge Posner chose those 12 to include in his
study, how Dr. Werden chose a different 13, or how Professors Levenstein and
Suslow chose a different 22?6 One might ask whether they had surveyed every
available study before including only the “best” cartel studies, and, if this was
their criterion, how they decided which studies were “best”. These authors are,
however, silent as to how they chose their studies and, perhaps for this reason,
make no explicit claims of representativeness of their compilations.
Each method of inclusion or exclusion has advantages and disadvantages.
We contend that a method that selects nearly every cartel study is also valid –
even though some of the covered studies will of course be considered superior
to others by various evaluators.



























Finally, a point not mentioned by Langenfeld is that the present authors
have served transparency by repeatedly laying bare their assumptions, sources,
methods of analysis, and raw data (Connor 2014b).7 This level of detail permits
users to accept or reject any data point they want to, which is exactly what
Oxera (2009) did for the European Commission. A spreadsheet containing
overcharges estimates and several other quantitative characteristics has been
made available to scores of economists, consultancies, and regulators.8
Yes, Some Overcharges Are Shockingly High, But So What?
On page 6, Langenfeld seems to be concerned that the Cartel Overcharges data
set “contains so many large outliers.”9 He suggest five possible reasons for the
reporting of excessively large cartel overcharges.
First, Langenfeld cites with approval a working paper by Boyer and
Kotchoni (2011) that examines the issue of how to correct for alleged statistical
bias in the Cartel Overcharges data set.10 They originally corrected for bias by
arbitrarily eliminating all overcharges >50%. Obviously, if one eliminates the
largest 5% of the overcharges, the mean average overcharge drops
significantly.11 This technique is no more valid than it would be if a researcher
decided to try to estimate the mean income in the US by first eliminating the
top 5% of earners from the sample. In light of their original decision to omit
the top 5% of results, it is curious that Langenfeld embraces their analysis as if
it were sound methodologically.
No modern economic model of collusion supports the assumption that
there is an upper limit to cartel overcharges; nor is there an upper limit in
natural markets for a percentage price-fixing overcharge.12 Rather, economic
models of cartels predict smooth increases in overcharges as economic factors
such as numbers of cartel members or elasticity of demand vary. Choosing
50% as a break point is completely arbitrary. High overcharge rates are not
uncommon in theory or in practice.13 Under the right conditions, many
monopolies achieve overcharges well above 100%, and under the right
conditions, cartels with few members mimic the price effects of monopolies.14
Second, the 2011 working paper cited by Langenfeld as key support for the
idea of dropping large overcharge estimates (Boyer and Kotchoni 2011) was
superseded in 2014 by a drastically altered working paper by the same authors
which Langenfeld unaccountably does not cite.15 In the latter version, Boyer and
Kotchoni (2014, 3) admit that “…the trimming of the sample at 50% has not been
well motivated.” After substituting a superior statistical method for trimming
the sample, they perform a meta-analysis that virtually replicates the factors
responsible for statistical bias discovered by Connor and Bolotova (2006).16
Third, on page 6, Langenfeld raises an issue about the appropriate formula
to calculate the percentage overcharge: if one has a dollar overcharge, should
one divide by the cartel-bloated actual affected commerce or by the but-for
affected sales? The latter approach does result in reporting higher overcharge
percentages, if they are positive. We believe that the latter definition comes
closest to the legal concept of damages. However, as a matter of practice,
lawyers, judges, juries, and most economists opt to report the former
percentages, and these are what is reported in Connor (2014a).17
Fourth, about 7% of the studies in our sample reported that cartels were
ineffective in raising prices. Langenfeld suggests that this low percentage may



























be due to a bias against publishing such results. We have admitted that a
“publication bias” may be present, though its extent and direction are highly
speculative. That is, it is possible that authors and publishers may be reluctant
to report zero overcharges and that this bias may inflate the reported
average.18 However, publication bias could easily work in the reverse fashion.
For example, it could be considered significant or noteworthy if a severely
punished cartel was shown not to have raised prices. Further, an economist
who testified that even though his or her client allegedly tried to raise prices
but failed to do so might have a strong incentive to publish his or her analysis
either as a post hoc defense of their testimony or as an implicit form of an
advertisement directed at potential defendants in price-fixing actions.
Regardless, there is no objective way to adjust overcharge averages for such
possible bias or to estimate the extent, if any, of this subjective bias.
Fifth, Langenfeld ignores the fact that Connor (2014a) directly addresses the
issue of possible publication bias. For example, on pages 299–304, Connor
subjectively “grades” the quality of the economic research used to generate
very large estimates and finds no research-quality reasons to devalue them.19
In any case, publication bias is unlikely to affect the soundless of any policy
implications of our research because at every turn in those papers we chose
conservative (i.e., low-overcharge) options.
Policy Implications Should Depend Upon Overcharges Estimates
Langenfeld critiques three policy analyses by Connor and Lande (2005, 2012,
2015) that depend in part on overcharges estimates derived from the
compilation reported in Connor (2014a).20
We are puzzled why on page 3 Langenfeld shows so much deference to the
10% overcharge presumption. Connor and Lande (2005) discuss in detail the
very thin evidence upon which it was established approximately 30 years ago,
and point out the discrepancy between the 10% overcharge presumption
enshrined in the 1987 US Sentencing Guidelines21 and the large body of current
evidence showing that median overcharges for all cartels ending since 1973 were
much higher: 25% of affected commerce (Connor and Lande 2005, Table 2).
Langenfeld has four specific criticisms with regard to overcharges. First, he
again raises the “quality variability” issue. For example, Langenfeld seems
more impressed that a respected European economic consultancy picked apart
the data in Connor (2014a) by removing many estimates it regarded as derived
from low-quality research, and yet, as Langenfeld writes:
In all, the pattern of overcharges Oxera estimates is similar to what
Connor and Lande (2005) and Connor (2014a) find: an overall mean of
22% compared to our overall mean of 25% (Langenfeld 2017, 5–6).
Again, we note that any researcher who eliminates a significant number of
studies from our universe should give readers pause: were they selectively
removing “unreliable” estimates to bias the results in a particular direction?
Perhaps not, but this possibility is a significant downside that our method
avoids.



























Langenfeld also fails to mention that as a check on the quality of the data
in the economic studies, Connor and Lande (2005) presented the above-
referenced separate study of what every available final verdict in US courts
concluded about cartel overcharges. These final verdicts contained specific
determinations of the dollar overcharges and affected commerce of hard-core
cartels. The 25 verdicts yielded median overcharges of 22%, which is a very
similar average to the median figure of 25% derived from the economic studies
analyzed in the same article.22
Second, Langenfeld wants to discard estimates for cartels connected with
US private price-fixing cases presented in Connor and Lande (2015)23 because
“Almost all of overcharges estimates come from cases involving settlements”
(Langenfeld 2017, 4).24 Langenfeld’s concerns about estimates derived from
settlements in damages cases are, however, misplaced, and are likely to flow
from a misunderstanding of our methodology. It certainly is true that almost
every private cartel case settles (as noted, however, we did compile a separate
sample of the private cases that yielded final verdicts). But in no case did we
rely upon overcharge estimates derived from settlement amounts, as if they
are surrogates for the actual amounts of damages.25 All of the overcharge
estimates we used in our analysis came from neutral studies of the affected
cartels, not from the settlements themselves.
Langenfeld further elaborates his concerns about cartel settlements, saying
that:
Connor and Lande’s calculations, however, do not necessarily show
inadequate deterrence. The level of any settlement presumably reflects
the strength of the allegations in that case and the probability of the
plaintiffs winning. The evidentiary basis for many of these cases may
be weak, and the value of the settlement and the estimates of
overcharges should be appropriately discounted.
This appears to be a principal reason why Langenfeld is dismissive of our
results and believes they should not guide antitrust policies or enforcement.
He argues that private cases settle for the “right” amount, a figure determined
by the strength of the evidence showing that the cartel raised prices by a
particular amount. This could be true, but it is irrelevant for making
conclusions about cartel deterrence.
The most important policy issue involving cartels is whether cumulative
cartel sanctions are at the optimal level.26 This can best be analyzed by
comparing the total sanctions paid by cartels to the actual size of their illegal
overcharges divided by the probability the cartel will be detected and
sanctioned.27 The focus of policy makers should be on the actual size of the
overcharges as calculated by a neutral analyst, not the overcharges claimed by
the alleged victims or agreed to as part of a settlement.
Overcharges estimates by disinterested experts are, of course, the figures
that we employed for our optimal deterrence analysis (Connor and Lande
2012). We totaled the actual amounts of the settlements in the private cases,
the criminal fines paid, and a surrogate for the (dis)value of prison time and
house arrest. Then we compared the total antitrust penalties paid to the
overcharges each cartel received. On average, the total sanctions were only



























9–21% of their optimal amount. We submit that we have asked and given a
good answer to the most important policy question involving cartels – that of
optimal deterrence.
Third, Langenfeld complains: “Some overcharge estimates in Lande and
Connor’s data appear to cover more products and longer time periods than the
conspiracies identified by the DOJ.”28 It is true that we sometimes adopted
more expansive definitions of affected commerce in class actions, but only if
the supervising judge accepted the plaintiffs’ claims in her order approving the
settlement.29 This can perhaps be explained by DOJ’s tendency to “plea
bargain” away products or time periods. Again, Langenfeld presents no
evidence that this happens systematically or that, if it does, how it might bias
our results.
Fourth, Langenfeld asserts that cartel fines should be based upon the size
of the overcharges or monopoly profits achieved by each cartel, rather than an
overall assessment as to how high cartels raise prices on average. In effect,
Langenfeld rejects the use of fining guidelines by antitrust authorities, which
are designed both for administrative convenience and for the goal of general
deterrence. Most of the world’s antitrust authorities aim for general not
specific deterrence, and their cartel-fining guidelines use affected commerce of
a participant in the authority’s jurisdiction as a surrogate for the harm caused
to customers of cartels (OECD 2016).
Langenfeld’s suggestion to employ actual monopoly profits is inconsistent
with the goal of the general optimal deterrence of cartels, which is based upon
the expectations of potential price fixers, not the actual impacts of their cartels.
It would seriously undermine the relatively clear signal that the current level
of sanctions sends to prospective cartelists. Implementing a regime of specific
deterrence is burdensome and generally impractical: it would require
prosecutors to incur heavy costs to calculate the magnitude of cartel
overcharges for each defendant, something they currently do not do. In effect,
this approach would reduce the number of cartel cases initiated and lower the
rate of successful convictions, further undermining the ideal of optimal
deterrence.
Replication of Experiments
Langenfeld ends his essay with the counsel of perfection: an appeal to
replicate the surveyed “experiments.” Of course, one may argue whether the
typical empirical work of economists may be classified as experiments in the
classical sense because testing in the bench sciences ideally requires a
comparison of a control group and a treatment group.30 In our own
experience, obtaining the underlying data used in social-science publications
more than ten years old is rarely successful, and >90% of the studies surveyed
are, as of this writing, more than a decade old. His suggestion about
replication is impractical.
A Contribution to Legal-Economic Scholarship
Amassing the world’s biggest data set on any phenomenon is in itself a
pointless exercise.31 The ultimate aim was to facilitate testing IO theories,



























models of collusive conduct, and assessment of antitrust enforcement.
Assembling a large data set enables scholars to demonstrate to the antitrust
legal community that the statistical approaches that are second nature to
industrial economists could provide new and valuable insights into the policy
making that should underlay the logic of competition, competition laws, and
the applicable remedies.32 We believe that our scholarship on cartel
overcharges has withstood the tests of time.33 We further submit that our
policy suggestions are well grounded in standard optimal-deterrence
principles and the current state of knowledge as to empirical facts about cartel
effects. Nearly all of Langenfeld’s assertions about the shortcomings of the
overcharges data set have previously been acknowledged by the present
authors as being theoretically possible, but none has been shown by
Langenfeld to be so empirically significant that the competition-policy
implications of our study are likely to be erroneous.
Notes
1. Langenfeld (2017) (hereinafter “Langenfeld”) is cited in the References below. Half of
Langenfeld’s article is concerned with assessing important research by Professor John Kwoka
on mergers, but here we focus only on the cartel-overcharge topics.
2. It is curious to note that James Langenfeld was an editor of the peer-reviewed Review of Law
and Economics when Connor (2014a) was reviewed. Connor (2014a) is a shorter, less detailed
version of a companion working paper (Connor 2014b). A similar predecessor version, Connor
(2007), was published by a different editor and referees.
3. However, all estimates met the tests of scholarly seriousness and disinterestedness. Hallmarks
of seriousness are the levels of detail mastered by the author, the use of appropriate methods
of analysis, and a balanced presentation of the results.
4. Langenfeld seems to rather dismissive of “ancient” cartels of the type habitually studied by
Suslow and Levenstein, whose work he seems to respect.
5. Connor and Lande (2005, 551–559).
6. Langenfeld incorrectly states the number to be 16.
7. This working paper is the third edition of postings of the raw overcharges data; the
observational details require appendix tables that take up 153 of the paper’s 316 pages.
Moreover, Connor (2014a, 38–42, 49–50, 51–52) spends several pages in self-critiques on the
same issues raised by Langenfeld, namely, variable quality of the estimates, the motives of
various types of authors and publishers in choosing to write about overcharges, the reliability
of alternative methods of overcharge computations, the unexpectedly small number of zero
observations, why central tendency is reported using medians, and the effects of very high
overcharges on asymmetry.
8. Use of the spreadsheet is gained through sale, thus satisfying a “market test,” or through a
gratis transfer. As several times in the past, I again invite interested researchers to contact the
author should they have a need for these data.
9. One of our referees wrote, “It is an oxymoron to say that there are many outliers. By definition,
an outlier is rare.” We agree.
10. This is a rather technical point that arises from statistical science. Such bias can arise when the
frequency of the data set is not normally distributed (i.e., graphs of a data set do not conform
to the “bell-shaped curve” seen in statistics’ textbooks. Wooldridge (2009, 126). Without a
normally distributed data set, statistical estimates from some types of econometric models can
be distorted and will not produce accurate conclusions. Similarly, extreme observations can
sometimes prove to be outliers (data points that are drawn from a different population the one
of interest) and that systematically distort tests. For example, if the experiment is designed to
investigate only effective cartels, then omitting all zero overcharges is a wise decision.
11. However, Langenfeld is incorrect in suggesting that dropping large overcharges before
performing an ordinary least squares regression model can be justified by the science of
statistics. Outliers can only be properly identified using techniques that require applying an
econometric model first and then looking for outliers that are not well predicted by the model



























employed. Woolridge (2009, 325–331). That is, outliers should not be initially identified by their
distance from the sample mean, but rather by their distance (conventionally two or three
standard deviations) from the regression plane.
12. The formula for overcharges divides the change in market price due to collusion by the but-for
price. A but-for price can be exceedingly small for high-tech services. For example, studies
have shown that the marginal cost for a debit-card transaction in the 2000s approaches zero,
which implies an infinite overcharge for banks charging a few pennies for each use of a debit
card. We note that most economists are schooled in measuring market power with the Lerner
Index, which does have an upper bound of 1.0 or 100%. The overcharge measure of market
power is a creature of antitrust-law scholarship, with which few economists are familiar.
13. Numbers of firms matter. In their leading undergraduate IO textbook, Carlton and Perloff
(2005, 165) provide an empirical example of oligopoly pricing. In a market for homogeneous
goods and linear inelastic demand (–38.9 at the competitive price), ten identical Cournot firms
achieve an overcharge of 35%, and a duopoly gets 86% above the competitive price. Cournot
firms do not communicate; under cartel conditions, i.e., when communication is permitted, the
duopoly overcharge is 129%.
14. See Tirole (1988) for a survey of game-theoretic models that apply to monopolies and
oligopolies. The major conditions that affect the ability cartels to achieve positive overcharges
include the shapes of the marginal cost and demand curves, product homogeneity, inelastic
demand, storage conditions, participants’ planning horizons and degree of cooperation, and
blockaded industry entry.
15. This 2014 working paper shortly thereafter reappeared in a slightly revised version as a peer-
reviewed journal article (Boyer and Kotchoni 2015). It is possible that this latter version was
not available to Langenfeld when he began to write his critique.
16. The bias-corrected median overcharge for all cartels ending after 1973 is 17.4% (domestic
cartels 15.0% and international 21.1%). If correct, these medians are lower than those we
reported, but they are still well above the US presumptive 10% level.
17. In any case, when the sources report a percentage, we have no way of determining which
method was employed. Similarly, several authors presented Lerner Indexes as measures of the
market power of cartels, which are always percentages lower than or equal to an overcharges
percentage. As Langenfeld notes, in recent years, to be conservative, Connor has not converted
these indexes to overcharges.
18. Connor (2014a) mentions this limitation.
19. Connor (2014b, 72–76) also anticipates this issue by examining controlled laboratory market
experiments that ought to be free of publication bias. We recognize that not all economists are
convinced that market experiments are good replicas of natural markets. Nevertheless, the
outcomes of controlled laboratory cartel experiments broadly support the pattern of
overcharges reported in Connor (2014a).
20. In each case, the authors employed the latest available version of the overcharges spreadsheet,
which grew over time, or its companion data set, Private International Cartels. In the 2005
article, 674 worldwide episodic estimates up to 2004 were employed, while the 2015 article
focused on just 71 US-fined cartels.
21. Because as a group international cartels generated markedly higher overcharges (around a 35%
median), the authors proposed that competition-law authorities ought to consider such
collusion an aggravating factor in their fining guidelines. Furthermore, we note that the United
States’ 10% figure is rapidly becoming obsolete. The European Commission since late 2006 has
used 15–30% of affected sales as its “starting point” for computing cartel fines. Many other
antitrust authorities have raised their presumed or starting points well above 10% in the past
decade. Also, the fact that Langenfeld supports the notion that cartelized markets have elastic
demands is contrary to the vast body of cartel theory and studies.
22. Langenfeld also omits mention of a section of Connor (2014a, 75–80) that examines an
interesting subset of overcharge estimates developed from trial records, plea agreements, or the
reports of competition commissions. Connor (2014, table 14) contains an analysis of a subset of
episodic overcharges estimates that directly flow from 485 cartel decisions of courts or other
antitrust authorities in 36 jurisdictions. Most of these estimates are studies of economists (none
with known interests in the cases) who used dates of collusion or affected commerce reported
in the decisions to calculate an overcharge estimate. While a minority of the decisions
contained sufficient temporal price data, most overcharges estimates required collecting prices
from market transactions. This analysis of legal decisions concludes that their median



























overcharge is 20.0% and the mean is 40.8% (Connor 2014a, 313). Both of these averages are
only a few percentage points lower than the full sample averages.
23. These estimates comprise only 13% of the cartels in Connor (2014a, table 2).
24. He repeats this assertion on page 7: “…the observations in their data are virtually all based on
settlements.”
25. Referring to Connor and Lande (2015), a study of private recoveries from US cartels, on page 5,
it states that “Almost all of the overcharges estimates come from cases involving settlements.”
On page 7, it is reiterated that “…the observations in their data are virtually all based on
settlements.”
26. That is, we interpret optimal deterrence theory to require empirical studies to sum all the
monetary penalties imposed and all penalties that have monetary equivalents.
27. This standard formulation is of course subject to a large number of qualifications and caveats
(Connor and Lande 2005, 516).
28. If private plaintiffs accepted the DOJ’s concept of affected commerce, then we used the longest
of the time periods in any of the cartelists’ posted guilty plea agreements, which is a sensible
protocol in cartel studies.
29. Plaintiffs in follow-on class-action suits can either accept the product mix and collusive period
cited in a guilty plea, or they have the burden of proof in basing a settlement on a broader
market definition. Market scope is not nearly so contentious an issue in damages suits as is the
size of the overcharge rate.
30. Other branches of science, such as astrophysics or paleontology, do not follow this rubric; these
branches are satisfied to apply predictability as the arbiter of truth, just like economics.
31. Langenfeld errs in stating that that the most recent edition of the overcharges data base
includes “[more than] 2000 studies and judicial decisions…” (Langenfeld 2017, 4). Rather,
Connor (2014a, abstract) cites “…more than 700…” such sources. Langenfeld must be referring
to the >2000 quantitative estimates of overcharges.
32. For example, Connor and a student published the first meta-analysis in the field of industrial-
organization economics precisely to test for systematic sources of quality bias in overcharges
estimates (Connor and Bolotova 2006).
33. We note that the four articles scrutinized by Langenfeld are heavily cited by scholars.
Including posted working papers, on 8th May 2017, Google Scholar had located 432 citations,
and there were 5595 downloads on ssrn.com. Moreover, dozens of peer-reviewed journal
papers in economics and finance have incorporated our donated cartel overcharges’ data into
their analyses (Connor 2016, 28–30).
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